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ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE AND THE PUBLIC
INTEREST-THE RESULTS OF DUE PROCESS
A. H. FELLERt
To any historian contemplating the intellectual history of this
country for the last fifty years the story of debate on administra-
tive law should commend itself as a most interesting chapter.
It starts with Dicey's horror at the very notion of administrative
law and his denial of its existence even though a widespread, if
rudimentary, system of administrative legislation and adjudica-
tion had been in effect for a long period prior to his day. Then
follows the gradual and progressive extension of the power of
administrative bodies, accompanied sometimes with short flurries
of protest but mainly with conspicuous public and even profes-
sional indifference. By the second decade of this century, the
system of administrative law seemed to have gained acceptance
in all quarters. It was then that an Elihu Root could say:
There is one special field of law development which has
manifestly become inevitable. We are entering upon the
creation of a body of administrative law quite different in
its machinery, its remedies, and its necessary safeguards
from the old methods of regulation by specific statutes en-
forced by the courts. * * * There will be no withdrawal
from these experiments. * * * We shall go on; we shall ex-
pand them, whether we approve theoretically or not, because
such agencies furnish protection to rights and obstacles to
wrongdoing which under our new social and industrial con-
ditions cannot be practically accomplished by the old and
simple procedure of legislatures and courts as in the last
generation.,
In the 1920's controversy flared up over what was conceived to
be the attempts of courts to restrict unduly the powers which the
legislature had conferred on administrative officers. The Ameri-
can literature on administrative law had its real birth during
this controversy, and it was characteristically a literature which,
in the main, accepted the premises laid down by legislative enact-
ment and concerned itself with the relations of the courts to the
t A.B., Columbia University, 1925; LL.B., Harvard University, 1928.
Special Assistant to the Attorney General of the United States.
1. Root, Addresses on Citizenship and Government (1916) 534.
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administrative process. 2 It is noteworthy that in this period of
controversy the protestants were the persons who were sym-
pathetic to the administrative process and who felt that the
courts were going too far in restricting proper and necessary
administrative action. The defenders of the courts were not par-
ticularly vocal, perhaps because they were not keenly aware of
the problem, or perhaps because they felt that the courts could
handle the situation without outside support. The issues of that
controversy were quite narrow, relating almost wholly to judi-
cial review. What administrative determinations are reviewable
by the courts? What is the extent of permissible review? What
degree of finality should be accorded to this or that type of
administrative fact determination?
In the early years of the New Deal the controversy flagged,
as Congress and the legislatures continued to increase the area
of administrative action and as the courts evinced less and less
inclination to interfere with the processes of administration.
Now we are again at the full tide of controversy. This time the
protestants are on the other side of the fence. Their concern
is with the limitation of the powers of administrative agencies
and with the increase of the extent of judicial control.3 The
protests are now many and loud, and the noise is so great that
it is often difficult to carry on rational thought processes.
In such a situation, it is well to start by clearing the field of
those considerations which appear to me ulterior to the subject
and whose presence can lead only to confusion, and, on occasion,
to demagoguery. First, I think we should try to isolate and
eliminate the element of current political controversy. This is
2. A few examples of that literature are Dickinson, Administrative Jus-
tice and the Supremacy of Law (1927); Frankfurter, The Task of Admin-
istrative Law (1927) 75 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 614; Wiel, Administrative Final-
ity (1925) 38 Harv. L. Rev. 447; Dickinson, Crowell v. Benson-Judicial
Review of Administrative Determinations of Questions of "Constitutional
Fact" (1932) 80 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 1055; MacFarland, Judicial Review of
the Interstate Commerce Commission and Federal Trade Commission (1933).
3. The current debate can be best studied in three symposia, (1938) 47
Yale L. J. 515-674; (1938) 12 U. of Cin. L. Rev. 117-287; (1939) 7 Gee.
Wash. L. Rev. 681-790. See also Landis, The Administrative Process (1938) ;
Vanderbilt, The Place of the Administrative Tribunal in Our Legal System(1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 267; Ballantine, Administrative Agencies and the
Law (1938) 24 A. B. A. J. 109; Stason, Administrative Tribunals-Organ-
ization and Reorganization (1938) 36 Mich. L. Rev. 533; Fuchs, Current
Proposals for the Reorganization of the Federal Regulatory Agencies (1938)
16 Tex. L. Rev. 335; Jaffe, Invective and Investigation in Administrative
Law (1939) 52 Harv. L. Rev. 1201; McGuire, Have We a Government of
Laws or a Government of Men? (1939) 73 U. S. L. Rev. 331.
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not an issue between the New Deal and anti-New Deal forces.
The New Deal did not invent the administrative process, and in
fact, not a single provision of any New Deal statute has added
any significant element to the machinery of that process. The
combination of investigating, prosecuting, and adjudicating func-
tions in a single agency ;4 the finality of fact determination;' the
trial examiner system ;6 the implementation of statutes by ad-
ministrative rules and regulations ;7 the cease and desist order ;8
the short-circuiting of the district courts by centralizing review
in the circuit courts of appeals;9 the elimination of traditional
rules of evidence ;1O every other element of the process that you
can think of, was conceived and put into practice long before the
New Deal came into being. We must beware of those who have
enlisted under the anti-administrative law banner for the sole
purpose of taking pot-shots at the present administration. At
the recent New York Constitutional Convention an unprecedent-
edly severe and reactionary proposal to curtail the traditional
administrative activities of the state"' was loudly supported on
the ground that it would constitute a slap in the face for the New
Deal.12
4. Such a combination is exemplified in the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission, the Federal Trade Commission, the Federal Power Commission,
the old Federal Radio Commission, the Packers and Stockyards Act, and
the immigration and deportation procedures of the Department of Labor.
5. The doctrine of finality of fact determination was elaborated by the
Supreme Court before it became a clearly established statutory policy. For
the gradual stages in the development of the doctrine with respect to the
review of orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, see Cincinnati,
New Orleans & Tex. Pacific Ry. v. Interstate Commerce Comm. (1896)
162 U. S. 184; Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Alabama Midland Ry. (1897)
168 U. S. 144; Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Ry. v. Interstate Commerce
Comm. (1907) 206 U. S. 142; Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Illinois Cen-
tral R. R. (1910) 215 U. S. 452; Manufacturers Ry. v. United States (1918)
146 U. S. 457.
6. For the trial examiner system of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion, see 4 Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission (1937) 73 et
seq.
7. This practice goes back to the earliest days of our government. Speci-
fication is hardly necessary.
8. Federal Trade Commission Act (1914) 38 Stat. 717, sec. 5, (1927) 15
U. S. C. A. see. 45.
9. Ibid.
10. Stephens, Administrative T7ibunals and the Rudes of Evidence (1933)
-passim.
11. For the text of the proposed amendment to the New York State Con-
stitution see New York State Constitutional Convention 1938, Revised Rec-
ord 2041.
12. Delegate Livingston made it quite clear: "This is a little practical
exercise for a whack, as we might say, at the New Deal." New York State
-Constitutional Convention 1938, Revised Record 2088.
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A second consideration which I think we should all leave be-
hind us when we enter this field is our sympathy or antipathy
to this or that particular statute. Because you don't like the
Labor Relations Act, and that Act is administered by a board
is hardly reason for excoriating the whole system of board or
commission administration. I venture to say that a substantial
proportion of those who are now attacking the administrative
process do so because they do not like the Wagner Act, and I
further venture to say that most of these people would not like
the Wagner Act no matter by what method it were administered.
There are those who are frank enough to say that they are per-
fectly willing to let the Federal Trade Commission go ahead on
the old lines but that the Labor Board is a different matter be-
cause it cannot be trusted. In effect, what these people are saying
is that they do not mind effective administration of the Federal
Trade Commission Act, but they do not want effective adminis-
tration of the Labor Relations Act. If you think the Labor Rela-
tions Act is bad, you should stand up and say so when the issue
is whether or not we should retain that Act. But that is a ques-
tion of labor law, not of administrative law.
Thirdly, I should like to ask you to put behind you your antipa-
thies or sympathies with regard to government regulation of
business as a general problem. You may not like government
regulation of railroad rates, but the question as to whether we
should or should not have such regulation is not the issue here.
There is one more issue which I should like to exclude from
this discussion and for this I must beg your indulgence. It is the
issue of the choice between court or commission for purposes of
regulation. By the very setting of this program, I think you
will permit me to assume that I should not trespass on your time
by dealing at length with that issue. The program before you
constitutes in a sense an estoppel of anyone who would attempt
to consider the possibility of sweeping away all commission regu-
lation. And so having put aside these other considerations, I
phrase the question for our discussion thus: How can adminis-
trative procedure be best adapted to the efficient dispatch of
public business entrusted to an agency without the impairment
of essential private rights?
If you will examine closely the question that I have put, you
will note that to some extent it carries its own answer, as indeed
19401
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-do most questions framed by lawyers. I have put the emphasis
upon the efficient dispatch of public business for the reason that
I believe that the first task of administrative agencies is to per-
form the job designated by the legislature. To most of you this
may seem self-evident; but, if you will ponder on it for a mo-
ment, you will realize that it is not self-evident to many of the
hostile critics of administration. An examination of some of the
proposals for reforming administrative procedure indicates that
some people seem to think that the purpose of administration is
to increase litigation and furnish better and more fees for law-
yers. An administrative agency is not created primarily for
the purpose of providing due process to those against whom it
is proceeding; it is created for the purpose of carrying out a
policy of Congress within the limitations of due process. The
task of administrative law is not to find the best way of making
it easy for the respondents in administrative proceedings; that
task is to find the best way of securing efficient enforcement of
the statutory policy. After that best way has been found, then
the time has come to decide what protection the interests of fair-
ness and justice require to be given to the respondents. If the
people want regulation of railroad rates, stockyards, wages and
hours, trade practices, and all the other matters now subject to
regulation by statute, and if they pay for public servants who
are supposed to enforce those statutes, they cannot be expected
to tolerate the erection of so many barriers to the carrying out
of their desires that the statutes fade into mere reminders of
good intentions and the public servants turn into public pen-
'sioners.
The second part of our main question, the protection of private
rights, is in Mr. Bikl6's domain. My job is to deal with the first,
and, to my mind, more important part--how can the public
interest best be protected? As I see it, there are really two
separate questions implied here-what is the best machinery for
enforcing the policy of the statutes, and what are the present
or threatened shackles which would endanger the efficiency of
that machinery beyond the point necessitated by the protection
of essential private rights? It should be clear that the question
of what is the best machinery cannot be answered in generalities,
once the decision has been made to choose the administrative in
preference to the judicial method. If the current interest in
Washington University Open Scholarship
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administrative procedure has taught us any lesson at all, it is
that the enforcement of each statute presents a distinct problem.
Your committee has realized the wisdom of this by allotting only
this one evening to general discussion and assigning all the other
sessions to the more important and more fruitful business of
dealing with particular statutes. I am the more content to leave
the question of the improvement of particular segments of the
administrative machinery unanswered here because that very
problem is now in the capable hands of the Attorney General's
Committee on Administrative Procedure and we can shortly ex-
pect a report which I am confident will rank as the most sig-
nificant document on Administrative Law produced in our day.
I turn then to the question to which certain general answers
are possible-what are the present or threatened dangers which
would shackle the ability of the administrative process to func-
tion efficiently in the protection of the public interest? The essen-
tial restrictions which statutes and courts now place on admin-
istrative action of a quasi-judicial nature are quickly rehearsed-
the agency must act on substantial evidence; it must make find-
ings; it must grant a fair hearing; it must not exceed the legal
powers granted by the statute. If it fails to do any of these
things, its determination can be set aside by a court which has
either been granted a special reviewing power by the statute or
which has in some cases assumed to act as a reviewing authority
under its general equity powers in the absence of an expressed
statutory right of review.
In theory these restrictions leave the administrative agency
considerable freedom of action. Indeed, it would be hard to find
anyone who would advocate stripping any of these protections
from the existing system. Nor do I find that the application of
most of these restrictions by the courts at the present time is
unduly shackling of administrative efficiency. There was a time
not long ago when courts were quite ready to upset administra-
tive fact determinations by substituting their own judgment of
the facts for that of the agency under review. There are still
more than a few cases where the same practice continues. 13 The
last few years have taught us, if we did not quite realize it be-
13. See in particular National Labor Relations Board v. Waterman
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fore, that judges are human, and that they cannot always be
expected to exhibit that perfection of judicial abnegation and
tolerance which the standard of administrative finality calls for.
A judge who feels that the administrative agency has been wrong
in its weighing of the evidence cannot but be tempted to stretch
the adjective in the phrase "substantial evidence" just a bit, and
to wonder whether it is not possible to call the evidence which
the agency points to in support of its action a "mere scintilla."
If the agency happens to be the National Labor Relations Board,
which has been getting bad notices in his favorite newspaper
(and that means almost any newspaper), the temptation can
easily get the better of him. At the moment, however, such vio-
lations of statutory limitations by the courts are not frequent
enough to constitute a serious menace to administration. Whether
the problem will become more serious in the future cannot be
foreseen. If it does, I see no effective remedy.'4 We will have
to continue to rely on the intelligence and probity of the judici-
ary, just as, in the last analysis, we shall have to rely on the
same qualities in our administrative officers no matter how many
obstacles the ingenuity of lawyers may build up about them.
The most serious existing shackles on administrative adjudi-
cation arise out of the implications of the first two Morgan
cases.' I shall not dwell on these famous monuments to the legal
ingenuity of Messrs. John B. Gage and Frederick Wood since
they will presumably be dealt with at length in the discussion
of the procedure of the Department of Agriculture. There are
plenty of disturbing things about these cases (including the fact
that no two experts seem to be able to agree on what they mean) ;
I shall content myself with mentioning only two. The first is the
implication that the Constitution prescribes a particular type of
procedure for administrative agencies. You will remember that
in the second Morgan case the Supreme Court had held that the
Secretary of Agriculture's determination was invalid because
there had been no intermediate report of a trial examiner sub-
14. The best available remedy is the willingness of the Supreme Court
to grant certiorari in such cases as the Waterman, Steamship case (1940)
60 S. Ct. 493, cited supra note 13.
15. (1936) 298 U. S. 468; (1938) 304 U. S. 1. I speak of the "implica-
tions" of the Morgan cases rather than the holdings, because the opinions
themselves do not go as far as many people, including both opponents and
advocates of the cases, have believed.
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mitted to the respondents, although the statute had provided no
more than that there should be a "full hearing." The Supreme
Court has no authority to decide what sort of procedure an ad-
ministrative agency should have and nothing could be more de-
structive of effective administration than the assumption of such
authority by the courts. In this case the Court decided to im-
pose a particular incident of procedure which was familiar to it
through its knowledge of the practice of the Interstate Commerce
Commission. The Court made no attempt to investigate the or-
ganization, the tasks and the needs of the Packers and Stock-
yards Division of the Department of Agriculture; and, even if
it wanted to make such an investigation, it had no facilities avail-
able. What is suitable for the Interstate Commerce Commission
might be destructive for the Department of Agriculture, and
vice versa. The courts have no way of determining this question
and they should leave it where it belongs-with Congress and the
administration itself. As I have said elsewhere, the attempt to
read the procedural predilections of judges into the due process
clause is as much to be condemned as the similar attempt to read
economic predilections into the same constitutional provision.
The second serious implication of the Morgan cases is the open
invitation to litigants to ask the courts to probe into the mental
processes of the administrative officer and to lay open the files
of his agency. No instrument more destructive of good govern-
ment and more productive of vexation, delay and harassment
has appeared in our legal system since the abolition of the old
chancery practice. No one has presumed to suggest that our
judges could be placed on the witness stand and examined and
cross-examined as to how and why they had arrived at their
opinions, how much of the records and briefs they had read, how
much writing they had done independently and how much they
had copied from their law-clerk's memoranda. No one has dared
to subpoena the papers from a judge's desk and cabinet to im-
pugn the validity of a judgment on appeal. Yet the attorneys
in the Morgan case have succeeded in doing just these things
with the Secretary of Agriculture. And to what end? To stretch
a simple controversy over the fixing of stockyard rates into an
eight year legal Calvary with the farmers bearing the cross. If
this practice were to become generalized, the review of admin-
istrative action would become a nightmare of interminable law
19401
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suits with administrative officers spending most of their official
lives in the witness chair.
I said earlier that these matters constitute the most serious
existing shackles on administrative adjudication, but I must con-
fess that they have not turned out to be as serious as they ap-
peared two years ago-the reason being that by and large the
courts (including the Supkeme Court) have had the good sense
not to follow these implications of the Morgan cases. In the
Mackay Radio'6 case the Supreme Court turned its back on the
intermediate report requirement almost as soon as it had been
enunciated, and other courts have been willing to find the most
subtle distinctions in order to wriggle out of the various Morgan
rules.Y7 There is no doubt in my mind that the Morgan cases have
done a great deal of damage and that administrative procedure
has been unnecessarily complicated in an effort to comply with
the decisions. Nevertheless, I do not find them to be as danger-
ous today as they once seemed to be.
At this point I believe that I can answer the question implicit
in the title of this paper-have the results of due process been to
hamper the effective protection of the public interest through the
administrative process? The answer is-at the present time,
"No." But when I turn to consider the future, I cannot feel
quite so confident of the answer.
It would be stretching your patience to the breaking point to
attempt to analyze in detail the mass of restrictive provisions
which critics of administration are pressing for adoption under
the guise of the necessary application of the requirements of due
process. These suggested restrictions can be grouped under three
main tendencies-the tendency to subject each and every admin-
istrative act to review; the tendency to assimilate administrative
procedure to the procedure of the courts; the tendency to reim-
pose judicial review of the facts. Each of these tendencies may
have its origin in a sincere desire to protect the respondents in
administrative proceedings, but I hold all of them to be pernici-
ous.
16. (1938) 304 U. S. 333.
17. See e. g., Plapao Laboratories v. Farley (App. D. C. 1937) 92 F.(2d) 228; United States v. Standard Oil Co. (D. C. S. D. Cal. 1937) 20
F. Supp. 427; Cunard S. S. Co. v. Elting (C. C. A. 2, 1938) 97 F. (2d) 373.
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I do not deny that there have been inconsistencies in the rules
governing the review of administrative determinations. The
"negative order" doctrine was illogical and confusing, and its
abolition by the Supreme Court in the Rochester Telephone case 22
was welcomed by nearly all students of the subject. Perhaps the
tests laid down by the Court in that case are not as free from
confusion as they might be. Perhaps changes in the law are
needed here and there with respect to the reviewability of par-
ticular types of orders. But a wholesale overturning of estab-
lished practice can lead only to more confusion, irritating delays
and intolerable expense to the taxpayers. If we think that cer-
tifications of elections by the National Labor Relations Board
should be made reviewable by the courts, let us deal with that
particular problem and not attempt to deal with the whole range
of administrative action at one swoop.
The tendency to assimilate administrative procedure to the
procedure of the courts is again a natural one. A lawyer likes
to do business under a single set of rules. He is accustomed to
the rules of the courts and he frequently believes that these
represent the only way in which business can be done by tribu-
nals. But administrative agencies are not courts. They were
created because experience showed that courts were inadequate
for the tasks demanded. Their needs and their functions are dif-
ferent. They grew out of different conditions, and they will of
necessity have to pursue different paths of development. The
particular type of procedure to which we are accustomed in our
courts is not the ideal of justice. Centuries of experience have
taught us that there is much which is wrong with our judicial
procedure and that reforms are not easily attained. Administra-
tive procedure is not bad merely because it is different, any more
than the equity procedure was bad merely because it differed
from that of the common law courts. The trenchant words of
Mr. Justice Frankfurter in his recent opinion in Federal Com-
munications Commission v. Pottsville Broadcasting Co. 23 should
be read carefully by every critic of administration. He said:
A much deeper issue, however, is here involved. This was
not a mandate from court to court but from a court to an
administrative agency. What is in issue is not the relation-
ship of federal courts inter se-a relationship defined largely
22. (1939) 307 U. S. 125.
23. (1940) 60 S. Ct. 437.
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The tendency to increase the sphere of judicial review is ex-
hibited in its most extreme form in the Logan Bill, more particu-
larly in some of its earlier drafts which gave a right to review,
first, by an administrative board of review, and then by a court,
to every act or omission to act of any federal officer or employee.18
It has been pointed out that such a provision would give a right
to review the refusal of a building guard to admit you to the
building after hours, or the refusal of a federal officer to grant
an appointment to an applicant for a job.29 But even eliminating
these absurd situations, the Logan Bill still constitutes a danger-
ous extension of the area of review. 20 It is only natural for a
lawyer to feel that every time he is aggrieved through contact
with the government there should be some remedy in the courts.
He is apt to forget the truism that only a small part of the mass
of human relationships can be made the subject of legal process.
When a large private corporation refuses to deal with a contrac-
tor because the purchasing agent decides he is unreliable, no one
dreams of asking for the protection of the courts; when govern-
ment purchasing agents do the same, there is a widespread cry
for court review and all the paraphernalia of a lawsuit. For
generations, the internal household arrangements of the govern-
ment were supposed to be free from judicial interference. But
now we see the Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia
permitting prospective bidders for government contracts to in-
voke the aid of the courts to upset the determinations of the
Secretary of Labor under the Walsh-Healey Act as to amount
of wages government contractors must pay in order to do busi-
ness with the government. 21
18. See the earliest published draft of the bill which later became S.
915, in Reports of American Bar Association (1937) 62 A. B. A. R. 846.
19. The latest draft of S. 915 as reported out by the Senate Judiciary
Committee on May 17, 1939, impliedly admits the extreme scope of the
earlier drafts by specifically exempting any case where the aggrieved party
"has failed to receive appointment or employment by any agency or inde-
pendent agency."
20. As reported out by the Senate Judiciary Committee, the bill provides
for review of any "final decision or order" of any agency or independent
agency. "Decision" is defined to mean "any affirmative or negative deci-
sion, order, or action in specific controversies which determines the issue
therein involved." "Controversy" is defined to mean "any dispute or dis-
agreement concerning any claim, right or obligation for or against the
United States and any refusal to grant any license, permit, or other privi-
lege."
21. Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins (App. D. C. 1939) 107 F. (2d) 627, cert.
granted (1940) 60 S. Ct. 513.
1940]
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by the courts themselves-but the due observance by courts
of the distribution of authority made by Congress as be-
tween its power to regulate commerce and the reviewing
power which it has conferred upon the courts under Article
III of the Constitution. A review by a federal court of the
action of a lower court is only one phase of a single unified
process. But to the extent that a federal court is authorized
to review an administrative act, there is superimposed upon
the enforcement of legislative policy through administrative
control a different process from that out of which the ad-
ministrative action under review ensued. The technical rules
derived from the interrelationship of judicial tribunals form-
ing a hierarchical system are taken out of their environment
when mechanically applied to determine the extent to which
Congressional power, exercised through a delegated agency,
can be controlled within the limited scope of "judicial power"
conferred by Congress under the Constitution.
Courts, like other organisms, represent an interplay of
form and function. The history of Anglo-American courts
and the more or less narrowly defined range of their staple
business have determined the basic characteristics of trial
procedure, the rules of evidence, and the general principles
of appellate review. Modern administrative tribunals are
the outgrowth of conditions far different from those. To
a large degree they have been a response to the felt need
of governmental supervision over economic enterprise-a
supervision which could effectively be exercised neither di-
rectly through self-executing legislation nor by the judicial
process. That this movement was natural and its extension
inevitable was a quarter century ago the opinion of emi-
nent spokesmen of the law. Perhaps the most striking char-
acteristic of this movement has been the investiture of ad-
ministrative agencies with power far exceeding and differ-
ent from the conventional judicial modes for adjusting con-
flicting claims-modes whereby interested litigants define
the scope of the inquiry and determine the data on which the
judicial judgment is ultimately based. Administrative agen-
cies have power themselves to initiate inquiry, or, when their
authority is invoked, to control the range of investigation
in ascertaining what is to satisfy the requirements of the
public interest in relation to the needs of vast regions and
sometimes the whole nation in the enjoyment of facilities
for transportation, communication and other essential pub-
lic services. These differences in origin and function pre-
clude wholesale transplantation of the rules of procedure,
trial and review which have evolved from the history and
experience of courts.24
24. 60 S. Ct. at 440-441.
1940]
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Of the third tendency, to revert to the practice of permitting
courts to review the weight of the evidence, there is little to say
that has not already been said many times over. The finality of
administrative fact determination if supported by substantial
evidence is the heart of the existing administrative law system.
It took many years of travail and controversy to arrive at this
standard. The burden of proof is on those who wish to turn the
clock back. I have yet to see any demonstration that the existing
standard is an evil. The best its opponents can do is to point to
a few isolated cases where administrators have gone astray. For
each one of these, a dozen cases of error by the courts can be
cited. We have had a long and wearying experience of judicial
review of the weight of the evidence in utility cases where the
claim of confiscation is involved. As a result, commission regula-
tion of utility rates has been almost completely discredited. By
holding back efficient and rapid adjudication of rate controver-
sies, the utilities have brought on themselves the T. V. A., gov-
ernmental "yardstick" plants, and the drastic reorganization of
public utility systems.
Above all let me again emphasize the fact that we have been
too much preoccupied with these matters of judicial review.
Sharfman found that out of some 15,500 cases decided by the
Interstate Commerce Commission only 155 reached the courts. 2Y
Most of the writing and controversy has been about the one case
out of a hundred that undergoes judicial scrutiny. The other
ninety-nine cases have received little attention. It is time now
to study them, to find out what each administrative agency does,
what its problems are, and how they can best be solved. There
is no royal road to administrative reform any more than to any
other problem of government. The administrative system has
plenty of faults, but these faults cannot be cured by wrapping
each and every agency in a uniform bundle of red tape. The
result of multiplying ill-considered general restrictions on ad-
ministrative agencies can only be intolerable delay in the dis-
position of controversies, the hamstringing of the discharge of
public business, and a vast increase in the cost of government.
25. 2 Sharfman, The Interstate Commerce Commission (1931) 452, n.
198.
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